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This theoretical paper draws the scientific community’s attention to how pharmacological
cognitive enhancement may impact on society and law. Namely, if safe, reliable, and
effective techniques to enhance mental performance are eventually developed, then this
may under some circumstances impose new duties onto people in high-responsibility
professions—e.g., surgeons or pilots—to use such substances to minimize risks of
adverse outcomes or to increase the likelihood of good outcomes. By discussing this topic,
we also hope to encourage scientists to bring their expertise to bear on this current public
debate.
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INTRODUCTION
Whereas techniques for the augmentation of brain function are
usually seen as beneficial when used as a form of medical treat-
ment, both amongst the general public (Schelle et al., 2014) and
in academia (e.g., Sandel, 2009) some concerns have been raised
about the possible negative moral and social impacts of the use
of these techniques in healthy people. For example, concerns
about such so called “cognitive enhancement” include seeing it
as a threat to the fairness and meaningfulness of competitive
activities, or as a potential threat to a meaningful human life.
Even though “cognitive enhancement” may refer to different brain
intervention techniques like genetic modification, pharmacolog-
ical substances, Transcranial Magnetic Stimulations (TMS), or
Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation (tDCS; Bostrom and
Sandberg, 2009), in this paper we focus on pharmacological cog-
nitive enhancers such as methylphenidate and modafinil. These
substances have been reported to modestly improve wakefulness,
attention, concentration, learning and retention of memory, not
only when taken by people diagnosed with mental deficits or
disorders, but also when taken by healthy individuals (Repantis
et al., 2010; Husain and Mehta, 2011; Coffman et al., 2014;
Gilleena et al., 2014; Meinzer et al., 2014).
In what follows, we discuss a seldom-recognized but crucial
way in which pharmacological cognitive enhancement may
impact on our society’s moral and legal norms: the availability
of such enhancers might evoke new duties for certain people.
In particular, it may impact on the professional duties of people
engaged in jobs where the lives of other people are directly at risk
(e.g., surgeons and pilots)—i.e., it may impact on what we can
(legally) demand these professionals to do. By exploring this issue,
we want to offer some insights into a particular way in which
scientific work on brain function augmentation may impact on
society: by enhancing our cognitive capacities, neuroscientific
progress may change our duties to one another (for in-depth
discussion see Vincent, 2011, 2013; Enck, 2014; Goold and
Maslen, 2014; Santoni de Sio et al., 2014).
HOW PHARMACOLOGICAL COGNITIVE ENHANCEMENT CAN
CREATE NEW DUTIES
Our main question may be framed in the following way: assuming
that a certain kind of pharmacological enhancement proves to be
relatively safe and effective at reducing risks of negative outcomes,
may some people, in virtue of what is at stake in the perfor-
mance of their professional roles (e.g., surgeons or pilots), be
sometimes legitimately expected to cognitively enhance themselves
even if they would rather not do so? Even though this question
may sound counterintuitive at present, we think there are good
reasons to assume that such an expectation might be a realistic
scenario in the future. In particular, we think that the professional
duty to use pharmacological enhancers may sooner or later be
raised in tort cases at least under restricted circumstances, for
instance in emergencies, when less invasive and at least as effective
alternatives are not available. If this happens, judges will take a
decision mainly through analogical reasoning. We thus think it is
important to anticipate how such reasoning is likely to run. By
having a clearer picture of such a possible future scenario, the
scientific community and the public more generally will be able to
think ahead about whether any pre-emptive steps need to be taken
to forestall the development of foreseeable undesirable social,
political, and legal consequences involved in such a scenario.
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In the following we present three main points in support of
our claim that a duty to enhance, as circumscribed above, may
arise in the future.
Firstly, scientific and technological progress has already
affected professional duties in the past. Surgeons, for instance,
are nowadays expected to deploy many measures that enhance
their performance and/or reduce the risks of fatal outcomes.
Historically, this professional duty to take measures has gradually
emerged over time, and progress in scientific and technological
knowledge has been one decisive element in the creation of the
duty. When, for instance, basic antiseptic procedures which are
common today—e.g., cleansing hands with carbolic acid—were
originally developed, their efficacy was not yet established, their
risks for the user were unknown, they were available only in select
research laboratories and medical practitioners were not expected
to deploy them. But today, now that the clinical value of these
techniques is widely recognized, and they are relatively inexpen-
sive, largely free of risk, and ubiquitously available (Gawande,
2012), medical practitioners cannot legitimately reject the request
to employ these techniques. The discovery of the antiseptic effi-
cacy of carbolic acid, as it were, brought with it the creation of a
duty to use it.
Of course, the analogy between cognitive enhancement med-
ications and carbolic acid is far from perfect—while the former
is highly invasive to an important domain, namely brain func-
tioning, the latter is not even skin-deep. Therefore, one should
not expect this analogy to be sufficient to make a case for the
professional duty to use pharmacological enhancers. However,
this analogy is arguably sufficient to make a more general point:
when it comes to professions with a high societal value like those
aimed at healing people or warranting their safety, it may be
legitimate for society to demand professionals to not follow their
individual preferences but rather the rules of good practice that
are proven to lead to optimal results, including those requiring
them to undertake particular treatments of their body. Even in the
most democratic society, the value of individual freedom of choice
of professionals is not protected unconditionally. For instance,
at present we already expect medical or legal professionals to
engage in continuing education programs. Often this is quite an
invasion on people’s lives since they must set aside time from an
often already busy schedule to attend classes after hours, often
losing sleep, and certainly losing personal time. But yet we do not
think that this imposition on their freedom is an unreasonable
one. We think that this is a sacrifice that we are entitled to
expect professionals to make for the benefit of their patients and
clients. The underlying thinking is that what’s gained in terms of
outcomes is presumed to be more important than the sacrifices
that others have to make to secure those outcomes.
Secondly, it may certainly be insisted that things are dif-
ferent with pharmacological enhancers, and that no matter
what happens with the compulsory use of non-invasive tech-
nologies or with compulsory non-pharmacological enhance-
ment programs, the use of medical substances that directly
affect the brain can never be imposed on professionals against
their will. However, even as things currently stand we already
sometimes expect some people to use medical substances that
directly affect their brain for the benefit of others—namely,
when we expect people who wish to operate motor vehicles
but who are diagnosed with conditions like epilepsy and dia-
betes to take medical substances to prevent the negative effects
of these conditions from adversely affecting others (Knoxville
Optical Supply, Inc. v Thomas, 1993 WL 574 (TennCtApp Jan
04, 1993)). Naturally, a good reason for them to take these
medications is simply the benefits to their own health. But it
has to be noted that the argument which justifies legal coercion
to use those substances in the case of the epileptic and dia-
betic motor vehicle drivers is not that the medical substances
will benefit them—in a liberal democracy paternalism is rarely
accepted as a valid justification for infringements on freedom—
but rather that their not taking those medications would impose
an unacceptable risk to others (if they should take to the roads
un-medicated).
We offer the above example in support of two points. Firstly,
there is already an existing and accepted practice of expecting one
group of people to take brain-invasive medications for the benefit
of other groups of people. Secondly, it makes little difference that
these examples involve the use of medications to treat rather than
to enhance, because the persons concerned are expected to take
the medications not for their own benefit, but for the benefit
of others. In fact, Queensland Health, the medical regulatory
body of the North-East Australian state, has recently followed a
similar reasoning pattern in relation to fatigue management. In
their Queensland Health (2009), it is suggested that in order to
cope with fatigue-related risks, surgeons could take up to “400
mg of caffeine [which is the] equivalent to about 5–6 cups of
coffee” (78) because “[c]ompared with other psychoactive drugs
(e.g., modafinil), caffeine is... more readily available and less
expensive” (79). Given that the report explicitly cites modafinil,
and that it only cites availability and cost as considerations that
favor the use of caffeine over modafinil, we think it is perfectly
conceivable that a future report may recommend such drugs to
be used (cf. Maslen et al., in press). To be sure, one may still
insist that this is not a desirable scenario, and that the protection
of minds from external interference should be recognized as a
human right. However, as a matter of fact, the right to “cognitive
liberty” (Bublitz, 2013) is not (yet) protected by international
human rights in the same way in which bodily integrity is, so that
the scenario that we propose remains realistic.
Finally, one may wonder whether concerns about safety will
in the end prevent the imposition of a duty to enhance in every
situation imaginable. Admittedly, the long-terms possible nega-
tive effects of the use of cognitive enhancers are not sufficiently
known (Madras et al., 2006; Volkow et al., 2009), and a greater
scientific understanding of these substances is needed before
normative conclusions can be confidently drawn (Maslen et al.,
2014). However, it is also a fact that methylphenidate has been
prescribed to children to treat the symptoms of attention deficit
and hyperactivity disorder for well over two decades. We cite this
example only to illustrate that there is at present already consensus
about the relative safety of these drugs to prescribe them to the
most vulnerable part of the population—namely, to children. This
point is salient because if, as a society, we deem the costs or risks of
particular cognitive enhancement technologies to be sufficiently
low, then this may lead us, together with the other considerations
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mentioned above, to impose a duty to use these medications onto
some people at least in some emergency situations, namely when
other more common forms of intervention like napping or being
replaced by another worker who is not fatigued are not available.
A GLANCE INTO THE FUTURE
Admittedly, we are not (yet) in the scenario that we just described.
The efficacy of pharmacological cognitive enhancement tech-
niques in reducing the rate of fatal mistakes and thus enhancing
the quality of performance of professionals like surgeons and
airline pilots has not been established yet (Förstl, 2009; Repantis
et al., 2010), and they are not even easily accessible. It is therefore
not surprising that the law has not yet demanded any profession-
als to enhance themselves nor have lay people advanced such a
demand.
As for the law, Goold and Maslen (2014) have offered a detailed
legal analysis on the issue of whether surgeons who are at risk
of making fatigue-related errors during patient care might be
considered legally obliged to pharmacologically enhance them-
selves, i.e., if, at least under certain circumstances, there can be
a legal duty to enhance for surgeons. Their conclusion is that, at
the moment, such a legal duty cannot be imposed (at least in
England and Wales). However, once one considers the reasons
behind their conclusion, it becomes clear that Goold and Maslen’s
statement about the current legal situation is not necessarily
incompatible with our claim about the future. Their case against
the imposition of a legal duty to enhance on surgeons, in fact,
critically depends on their reasonable doubts about the efficacy of
current enhancers, and the possible negative side-effects of these
substances. Moreover, this conclusion does not affect the validity
of our theoretical point. In fact, as Goold and Maslen themselves
explicitly state, in a hypothetical scenario in which efficacious
and relatively safe cognitive enhancers were available, surgeons
might be burdened with a duty to take pharmacological cognitive
enhancers to reduce the risks of fatal fatigue-related error, at
least under some emergency circumstances, namely when other,
less invasive, options like napping or being replaced by another
surgeons are not available. And it is this kind of hypothetical
scenario that our reasoning has taken into account, and that
future judges may have to decide upon.
As for lay people, they also seem to believe that no obligation
to enhance should ever be imposed on professionals or other
subjects (Maslen et al., in press). Many are indeed skeptical even
about the moral permissibility of the use of pharmacological
enhancers in any circumstance (Santoni de Sio et al., in press).
Again, this is reasonable and understandable. Lay reasoning
widely reflects the current state of affairs of scientific progress.
From this perspective, lay reasoning is somehow similar to that
of the above-mentioned legal scholars: because pharmacological
cognitive enhancement is currently neither uncontroversially effi-
cacious nor safe, people are legitimately wary and suspicious of it
and reluctant to expect anyone to use it. However, lay reasoning
may also reflect less rational and justified concerns. Medical
enhancement substances are perceived negatively compared to
other “natural” enhancers, and as a consequence the use of phar-
macological cognitive enhancement might be stigmatized also in
an irrational way (Faulmüller et al., 2013).
CONCLUSION
Reflections on the social impact of scientific and technological
progress can come in different forms. On the one hand, we may
reflect on how current technologies and techniques are already
impacting on society. However, we may also wish to reflect on how
the social, political, legal, and moral landscape may change due
to pressure from reasonably expected future advances in science
and technology, and think ahead about whether any pre-emptive
steps need to be taken to forestall the development of foresee-
able undesirable social, political, legal, and moral consequences.
Adopting this latter “socially responsible innovation” approach
(Moor, 2008; van den Hoven, 2013) which has recently been
embraced also by the European Commission (2011), our paper
has discussed the possible impact on society of future advances
in pharmacological cognitive enhancement. We have argued that
the availability of techniques that can enhance performance may
in the future impose new duties on certain people under certain
circumstances.
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